Wednesday, December 19, 2007

Levelling the Playing Field

I love your counter-intuitive Hall of Fame theory. In your mind, because Beefed-Up Barry scored better numbers against Roids Roger than Roger Maris did versus some pre-steroids pitchers (my girly lack of sports knowledge rears its ugly head), Bonds has got a stronger case for HoFa induction.

That may be true when you've got two pimple-backed, big-headed players facing off against one another. But I'm betting that, more often than not, Barry was up against pitchers who were not on the juice. That's why his overall numbers are so damned good.

The same problem exists in law and economics. (How's that for bringing it all back home?) The basic premise of l&e is that, in the face of a problem, two individuals will bargain to an optimal solution. This argument assumes that you've got two sophisticated individuals (a Bonds and a Clemens) who tussle it out until each party obtains a decent result. It's perhaps not everything that these guys wanted, but it's enough to make each party happy. Pareto-optimal, as they say.

In reality, it's more like Barry Bonds versus nameless Maris pitcher.

Take your cellphone bill. A big company creates a standard contract that is not open to negotiation. It contains some hella terms that no individual would ever agree to. (Hundred dollar termination fees? Arbitration provisions?) Yet, here we are. Every one of us bowled over by some roided-up company that wields extraordinary power.

Why is it that individuals have so little control when it comes to negotiating with corporations? Clearly, the lack of organization or cohesiveness among individuals are great impediments to bargaining. Is there way that we can overcome those obstacles?

Maybe all we need are some steroids.

Love,
Sammy

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